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O
ver the last two decades, public policies de-
signed to provide income support to impov-
erished households have shifted focus to en-
courage and support work. As a result, the tax system 
has become as important as the welfare office in sup-
porting the poor, as evidenced by the nation’s largest 
anti-poverty program for working families: the Earned 
Income Tax Credit (EITC).
Although the EITC is an income tax credit, it func-
tions for many of its recipients as a transfer payment 
to offset payroll taxes and provide additional cash. The 
EITC is fully refundable, meaning that its size is not 
determined by a person’s income tax liability. Workers 
eligible for the largest credits have no federal income 
tax liability but still qualify to receive the full value of 
the credit. A key difference between the EITC and other 
forms of income support is timing. The norm for pro-
grams such as cash assistance, Food Stamps, and Social 
Security is a monthly payment. In contrast, almost all 
EITC households receive a large, single payment after 
the end of the tax year for which they qualify. 
This article considers the problems with almost ex-
clusive reliance on year-end (“lump-sum”) payment, the 
value  of  providing  payments  periodically  throughout 
the year, and the limitations of the current EITC advance 
payment  option.  President  Obama’s  fiscal  year  2010 
budget has proposed to eliminate the advance option, 
adding greater urgency to this debate. This paper con-
cludes with a design framework for an alternative peri-
odic payment system.
The Need for a Viable Periodic  
Payment Alternative
Practical evidence and some research points to the 
popularity of large refunds among EITC recipients. But 
a transfer payment system that effectively obligates 
low-income working households to wait months for 
basic assistance they have earned is questionable 
social policy. For tax year 2008, refundable tax credits 
could comprise as much as 43 percent of annual 
income for the households benefiting most from the 
EITC.2 Expansions of the Child Tax Credit and educa-
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26tion credits in the American Reinvestment and Recov-
ery Act of 2009 (ARRA) will further augment refunds 
for some working families, at least temporarily.
From the perspectives of both recipients and society 
as a whole, there are additional merits to having a viable 
periodic payment alternative.
First, available data indicate the EITC is mostly used 
to finance consumption, such as everyday bills, or for 
some families, larger items such as appliances or fur-
niture.3 While efforts to help EITC recipients use large 
refunds for longer-term wealth building strategies are 
admirable and in some cases successful, evidence sug-
gests that most low-income claimants use the majority 
of their refund dollars for more immediate needs.
Second, a significant portion of EITC dollars intend-
ed to assist households in need has instead flowed to 
commercial tax preparers. Much of this outflow relates 
to a product—the refund anticipation loan (RAL)—de-
veloped  to  accelerate  filers’  receipt  of  their  money.4 
These high priced loans, with annual percentage inter-
est rates ranging from 40 percent to over 700 percent, 
divest about $1.57 billion in fees each year from EITC 
payments to working parents.5 RALs are popular because 
they allow families to get their money more quickly, and 
large lump-sum refunds disguise their costs, which can 
be deducted from the refund amount.
Third, the EITC—in both intention and effect—makes 
work pay, but an almost exclusive reliance on year-end 
payments weakens the connection between the credit 
and work. The lump-sum payment can look more like a 
bonanza to both recipients and policy makers. A more 
effective  and  widely  used  periodic  payment  option 
would  better  underscore  the  “earned”  quality  of  the 
credit.
Fourth, delivering the EITC primarily through year-
end refunds also limits its effectiveness as a policy in-
strument. The  credit  provides  a  boost  in  purchasing 
power which helps families pay off bills and perhaps 
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Table 7.1  Payment methods for earnings supplements and child benefits in other countries, 2007
1  The scope of the tax agency role is relatively recent;  the absorption of the Child Benefit Agency into Inland Revenue in the United Kingdom occurred in April 2003.
2  Calculated for single parent, two pre-school children, full-time work, earning $15,000 (any child care components excluded).  To facilitate cross-national 
comparability, all figures are in U.S. dollars.  Rates of exchange used per 1 unit of foreign currency are:  Australian Dollar ($0.80 US); Canadian Dollar ($0.90 US); 





























27finance some larger household items. Periodic payment 
could increase the affordability of housing or health in-
surance.6 It could also enhance other initiatives (such 
as refundable assistance for higher education and child 
care) where the timing of outlays does not currently co-
incide with tax season.7
Finally,  error  and  fraud  associated  with  the  EITC 
remain major concerns. Although frequently-cited es-
timates  of  improper  claims  are  likely  overstated  and 
include  many  inadvertent  mistakes,  the  EITC  does 
provide opportunities for those taxpayers (or tax prepar-
ers) willing to commit fraud. Reducing single-payment 
payoffs at tax time could reduce the potential allure of 
such illicit activity.8
Periodic payment is the predominant method used 
in several other countries to disburse earnings supple-
ments and child benefits that are analogous to the EITC 
(see Table 7.1). Although each country’s programs are 
distinctive, the general recognition of the merits of pe-
riodic payment and the operation of viable systems for 
providing it are instructive.
The EITC Advance Payment Option— 
Structure, Utilization, and Issues
Federal  policy  recognized  the  merits  of  periodic 
payment and introduced an advance payment option 
of the EITC in 1978. Unfortunately, the Advance EITC 
suffers  from  a  poor  design,  as  reflected  by  the  low 
take-up rate among recipients.
Most workers who expect to qualify for the EITC 
and are able to claim at least one qualifying child for 
the current year are eligible to receive advance pay-
ments and do so by enrolling through their employ-
ers. The employer has no role in verifying eligibility, 
and there is no required communication with the IRS. 
The advanced amount is determined according to IRS 
formulas and assumes the current period’s wages are 
received for the full year; this amount is added to the 
employee’s paycheck on a regular basis. The employer 
finances advance EITC payments by deducting them 
from its withholding and tax payments to the IRS. A 
worker receiving EITC advance payments must file a 
Form 1040 or 1040A tax return and report the pay-
ments. If the total advances exceed the credit for which 
the  worker  is  eligible,  the  excess  constitutes  an  ad-
ditional tax owed and could result in a net payment 
liability.
Very  few  EITC  recipients  utilize  the  advance 
payment option. Tax return statistics show a general 
decline in recent years in the number and proportion 
of filers claiming the Advance EITC. In tax year 1997, 
1.5 percent of EITC returns for workers with qualify-
ing children reported an advance. This declined to 0.8 
percent by tax year 2001 and remained at that level 
in tax year 2004. Total reported advance payments for 
tax year 2004 represented just 0.16 percent of the total 
EITC claimed by taxpayers with qualifying children.9
A  1992  General  Accounting  Office  (GAO)  report 
identified three principal reasons for low utilization of 
the EITC advance payment option that remain relevant 
today: 1) many eligible employees and their employers 
were not aware of the option; 2) some employees feared 
having to repay advances when they file their tax returns; 
and  3)  some  employees  preferred  a  single  lump-sum 
refund payment instead of smaller periodic payments.10 
Awareness  of  the  advance  payment  option  likely 
remains low, and outreach efforts may not change this. 
A 1997 IRS experiment designed to inform eligible re-
cipients led to only a very small increase in advance 
payment usage.11 A 2006 experiment at different loca-
tions of a major national employer doubled to quadru-
pled advance payment use, but that similarly amounted 
to a small number of new participants.12
The  possibility  of  repayment  liability  is  another 
factor  behind  low  take-up,  though  program  design 
mitigates this risk. The advance payment option has a 
ceiling, set at 60 percent of the EITC for a family with 
one qualifying child, which reduces the risk of year-end 
tax liabilities. Most EITC recipients could safely receive 
advance  payments  and  not  risk  a  repayment  liability 
(for example, a household earning an annual income of 
$10,000 would receive a maximum advance payment 
equivalent to just 43 percent of the total credit for two or 
more children). Nonetheless, EITC recipients appear to 
demonstrate great aversion to any risk of owing money 
back at the end of the year.
The  preference  for  a  lump-sum  refund  also  runs 
strong among taxpayers in general. Nearly all EITC re-
cipients (96 percent) claim a tax refund, as do a majority 
of non-credit recipients (76 percent).13 By intentionally 
generating a refund via overwithholding (having more 
taxes withheld than is necessary to meet annual tax li-
ability), EITC recipients and others effectively use the 
IRS as a de facto savings account that enforces tempo-
rary fiscal discipline.14
In  addition  to  low  utilization,  the  Advance  EITC 
also suffers from compliance problems, documented in 
reports from the GAO and the Treasury Department.15 
The  GAO  provides  recommendations  for  administra-
tive changes to address the compliance issues but also 
raises concerns about their practicality and effective-
ness. It concludes by suggesting that the Secretary of 
the Treasury evaluate the options and advise Congress 
on whether the advance payment option should be re-
tained. President Obama’s FY 2010 budget proposal to 
eliminate the Advance EITC indicates the judgment of 
the new administration.
28Design Framework for A New EITC Periodic 
Payment Option
The current Advance EITC is ineffective, yet exclu-
sive reliance on lump-sum payments is also unwise. The 
following are suggested design principles (also summa-
rized in Table 7.2) to guide consideration of a viable 
alternative  system  for  periodic  payment  of  the  EITC 
(and possibly other current and prospective tax-based 
income supports).
Make payments directly, not through 
employers
In theory, employers are good intermediaries: they 
already have a periodic payment relationship with their 
employees, and they have more frequent contact with 
the  IRS  through  regular  deposit  of  payroll  taxes  and 
withholdings and quarterly report filings. Nonetheless, 
employers will not play a meaningful role in periodic 
payment.  An  employer  has  little  of  the  information 
needed to assess worker eligibility and make accurate 
payment calculations.16 Workers appear to have little 
appetite for interacting with their employers in this way. 
There is also nothing in the international experience to 
indicate greater potential for employer involvement.17
Use the IRS to administer periodic payments
Although the IRS has less of an explicit social welfare 
function than tax agencies in other countries, it remains 
the best choice for making periodic payments. Govern-
mental entities administering other public benefits are 
not well-suited to taking a lead role in making periodic 
payments, especially as most EITC recipients are not now 
clients of social welfare agencies.18 The EITC is tied to 
work, which is not the focal criterion for other benefits 
programs. The enforcement-centered approach of tradi-
tional benefits programs runs counter to the self-determi-
native, voluntary compliance character of the tax system 
and would unreasonably differentiate EITC recipients.19
Adopt a modest “safe harbor” to protect 
taxpayers from repayment risk
The current EITC advance payment option has both 
prospective and retrospective elements: a prediction for 
advance payment eligibility based on current income 
(similar to payroll withholding), and a year-end calcula-
tion of the actual credit due.
In  some  situations,  such  as  a  temporarily  unem-
ployed worker returning to a well-paying job, requir-
ing repayment of excess periodic payments may make 
sense. More problematic are overpayments that result 
from  the  inability  to  project  accurately  the  EITC  for 
which  a  taxpayer  is  ultimately  eligible.  Income  may 
fluctuate  in  unanticipated  ways  over  the  course  of  a 
year, and family composition can change unexpectedly. 
A safe harbor limits liability by providing a method 
for a taxpayer to demonstrate presumptively that she is 
acting in good faith. A worker requesting and receiv-
ing  EITC  periodic  payments  in  good  faith  should  be 
protected  against  incurring  a  repayment  liability. The 
safe harbor could be a combination of having properly 
claimed the EITC in the prior year and a reasonable ex-
pectation of eligibility in the current year.
Accept some degree of target inefficiency
Inherent in the safe harbor concept is recognition that 
some workers will receive payments for which they were 
not eligible. This will decrease the EITC’s target efficien-
cy, or the proportion of total payments that are received 
by the program’s target population. The design challenge 
is to keep the inefficiency within reasonable bounds.
If prior year eligibility for the EITC is used to estab-
lish eligibility for current-year periodic payment claims, 
target efficiency will depend in part on how likely re-
cipients are to claim the credit in successive years. One 
IRS analysis found that just over 70 percent of tax year 
2000 EITC claimants also claimed the credit in tax year 
2001.20 Yet an IRS study looking at six consecutive tax 
years found that about one-quarter of EITC claimants 
over that period received the credit in only one year. 
The tolerance for target inefficiency is also a policy 
decision that may vary depending on the reason for in-
eligibility. Two studies of the EITC population found that 
fluctuations in eligibility and participation were more 
closely tied to variations in income, rather than changes 
in family composition.21 
The Advance Child Tax Credit was used as an eco-
nomic stimulus in 2003 and set a precedent for tolerat-
ing overpayments in favor of administrative simplicity. 
Eligibility was based on prior-year eligibility but also 
required applying the advanced credit against the sub-
sequent year’s credit. However, recipients who received 
an advance in excess of their subsequent year credit did 
not incur a repayment obligation.
Use communication and reporting to improve 
targeting and efficiency
 There is currently no means for a taxpayer to indi-
cate directly to the IRS that she expects to be eligible for 
the EITC in the current tax year. She can only make a 
claim after the fact through the income tax return filed 
in the next calendar year.
Schedule EIC (part of the Form 1040 which the tax-
payer completes in order to claim the credit for quali-
fying children) could include a section permitting the 





























29for the credit in the coming year. The declaration would 
be signed under penalty of perjury. New claimants with 
qualifying children could submit a similar signed decla-
ration of expected eligibility as a stand-alone document. 
Creating additional, less traditional opportunities for 
information transfer from taxpayers to the IRS—via post-
card,  telephone,  or  online  transaction—could  further 
improve the efficiency of a periodic payment system.
 
Limit the portion of the EITC that can be 
obtained through periodic payment
Although the rationale for providing families with 
benefits as quickly as possible could justify accelerating 
the full amount of the credit, it is preferable to follow 
the current advance payment practice of limiting the 
periodically-paid percentage. This approach provides a 
cushion that reduces repayment risk for recipients and 
serves as a curb on inefficiencies resulting from the safe 
harbor approach. It preserves the ability to use the EITC 
(along with overwithholding) as a means of accumula-
tion, and it minimizes complications related to the tran-
sition from lump sum to periodic payment. Initially, for 
reasons of both simplicity and transition, setting a single 
default (for example, 50 percent of the anticipated total 
credit) is probably wise.
Balance liquidity with accumulation, connec-
tion to work with administrative feasibility, in 
determining payment frequency
A focus on helping households with everyday needs 
and reinforcing the earned quality of the EITC would 
argue for weekly or biweekly disbursement (as occurs in 
other countries). However, this would ignore the dem-
onstrated desire for some degree of forced savings; fur-
thermore, increased frequency of payments inevitably 
increases administrative costs.
Most of those who interact with the IRS more than 
once a year do so roughly every quarter.22 Quarterly 
periodic EITC payments would enable some accumula-
tion while providing a regular source of funds. Once 
the program is established and well-tested, a monthly 
frequency option could be explored as well. 
Mandate use of direct deposit
Direct  deposit  to  financial  institution  accounts 
is  most  often  the  only  payment  vehicle  available  for 
in-work tax benefits in other countries. Private employ-
ers and the public sector in the U.S. are trying to move 
away from paper checks, and a new periodic payment 
system should reinforce that orientation.
A periodic payment system would have to address 
the  challenge  of  delivering  payments  to  “unbanked” 
households, perhaps by offering institutional incentives 
for opening accounts and new product lines.23 The ex-
pansion in transaction volume that would result from 
greater use of periodic payments could advance those 
efforts. Accounts could be established for any recipient 
not providing deposit account information on the tax 
return or perhaps on the Schedule EIC or separate dec-
laration of eligibility.24 The Direct Express Card (debit 
card) offered to Social Security beneficiaries is another 
delivery model. 
Make periodic payments an “opt-in” for initial 
implementation
There is increasing recognition of the value of au-
tomatic  enrollment  with  an  opt-out  opportunity,  as 
opposed to programs that require voluntary opt-in for 
enrollment. The Pension Protection Act of 2006 permits 
employers to use automatic enrollment with 401(k) and 
403(b) plans. Workers have the right to withdraw from 
the plan, but the expectation is that automatic enroll-
ment will increase retirement savings among those who 
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Encouraging Direct Deposit
Direct deposit offers a number of advantages, such as safety 
and convenience, yet many people who receive Social Secu-
rity and Supplemental Security Income (SSI) still get checks.   
Go  Direct  is  a  national  campaign,  sponsored  by  the  U.S. 
Department of the Treasury and the Federal Reserve Banks, 
aimed at increasing awareness of these benefits and helping 
people sign up for direct deposit of federal payments.  An 
estimated 140 million federal benefit checks are mailed each 
year; Treasury estimates that if these payments were convert-
ed to direct deposit, taxpayers could save about $130 million 
annually.  
But what if recipients don’t have a bank account?  The Direct 
Express® Debit MasterCard® card offers an innovative solu-
tion.  This prepaid debit card allows recipients to receive their 
benefits and make purchases electronically, with no risk of 
lost checks or stolen cash.  Recipients do not need a bank 
account to sign up for the card, and there is no credit check or 
minimum balance requirement.  In addition, there is no sign 
up fee and no monthly fee. Most services are free; there are 
fees for a limited number of optional transactions and services.   
Payments are made every month and are automatically posted 
to the Direct Express® card account, allowing users to with-
draw cash from ATMs, make purchases at stores that accept 
Debit MasterCard® or even pay bills online.  Currently, the   
Direct Express card may only be used for Social Security and 
SSI payments.  For more information, visit www.GoDirect.org 
and www.USDirectExpress.com.  may wish to save but would have otherwise failed to 
take action to opt into the plan.
In this context, automatic enrollment would reflect 
a value judgment that periodic payment of the EITC is 
the preferred method from both the recipient’s and so-
ciety’s perspectives. This proposition is yet untested. At 
the outset, policy makers should aim to offer recipients 
two equally reasonable and viable choices.
Given the history of the advance payment option, 
the  “opt-in”  approach  requiring  taxpayer  initiation 
would likely lead to low initial take-up. However, this 
would actually be advantageous as periodic payment 
mechanisms are tested and improved.
 Consider implementing periodic payment in 
conjunction with program expansions
Any attempt to shift from large lump-sum refunds to 
periodic payments requires attention to transition. The 
approximate current levels of EITC benefits have been 
in place for over a decade, and households have un-
doubtedly incorporated the payment pattern into their 
budgeting and cash management. Some sectors of the 
economy are likely accustomed to the seasonal flows 
as well.25
ARRA makes temporary enhancements to the EITC 
and the Child Tax Credit which the administration and 
Congress will likely seek to make permanent. Expan-
sion of either program would provide an opportunity 
to phase in a new periodic payment system for those 
credits over two to three years.
Conclusion
In its lump-sum form, the EITC meets a desire for 
large tax refunds seen throughout the population. Nev-
ertheless, there are strong reasons for developing a viable 
alternative, with none more significant than accelerat-
ing payment of earned benefits to cash-strapped fami-
lies. The flaws evident from experience with the existing 
Advance EITC recommend a new approach. The prin-
ciples enumerated in this article provide a framework 
for developing a detailed design of a periodic payment 
system. Although no single approach is perfect, realizing 
the full potential of the EITC requires greater attention to 
the mechanics of how payments are made. 
Administrative responsibility
•   Internal Revenue Service
•   No employer role
Eligibility
•  Prior year EITC receipt plus declaration on Schedule EIC of expected 
continued eligibility
•   Detailed declaration of expected eligibility from new claimants
Recipient choice
•   “Opt-in” during initial implementation period
•   Goal of presumptive (“opt-out”) participation
Payment method
•   Direct deposit to financial institution accounts
•   Debit cards or special accounts for unbanked recipients
Frequency of payments •   Probably quarterly (at least initially)
Size of payments •   Initial default of 50 percent of anticipated total credit (equally spread       
 over periodic payments)
Periodic reporting •   Development of mail, phone, or online methods for periodic verification 
of eligibility
Error reconciliation
•  “Safe harbor” (no repayment obligation) for payments based on valid 
declarations of eligibility
•    Conventional enforcement and recovery of improper payments
Table 7.2  Elements of a Periodic Payment System 
This table summarizes potential elements of an alternative periodic payment method for the EITC using the  
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